(A short note written for and published by the Asymmetric Threats Contingency Alliance (ATCA) dated 28 September, 2007)
With the Burmese situation threatening to implode and the matter placed before the UN Security Council, all eyes are now on China (and to a lesser extent on India) as Burma's strong backer. What are China's options on this delicate Burmese chessboard?
The first, of siding with the Junta in any form, is a non option, as the world's commentators would agree. China needs all the positive international image she can get for her coming-of-age world party, the Beijing Olympics, as a responsible super-power and global stake-holder. What is more, with Burma's popular groundswell for change, it is not a foregone conclusion that this time around, the Junta may be able to maintain the upper hand.
The second, of supporting regime change demanded by the National League for Democracy under Aung San Suu Kyi, is equally, if not more, inconceivable. Not only would this raise many unwelcome questions on how China approaches her own democratic development, but by painting the Junta into a corner, this may also provoke hard-line bloody repressions causing even more serious turmoil.
The third, as China is wont to do, is to declare the current unrest an internal problem for the Burmese to solve on their own. This convenient response, however, may not suit China's best interests as it may appear. Allowing the situation to fester would prolong an inherently unstable regime at China's doorstep. Or it may precipitate a radical revolution for democracy liable to be copied as 'colour revolutions' amongst China's neighbours, or worse still, by the monks in Tibet or the Muslim separatists in Xinjiang. So sitting tight while a neighbour catches fire doesn't sound like an attractive proposition.
But China is not alone in believing that sanction or confrontational coercion is necessarily the best way to resolve conflict. The immediate victims of these strictures are often the poor masses rather than those in power. Nor, of course, does she believe that Western democracy is a universal and instant panacea, a one-size-fits-all solution regardless of circumstances. There is no lack of faltering examples of hasty democratization from Russia to the Middle East. On the other hand, China's own example, and those of modern Vietnam and some East Asian countries, suggest that democracy is not always a pre-condition to development (China Modernizes, Randall Peerenboom, 2007).
So China's best bet would seem to be, first, to cajole the Junta to refrain from aggravated repression and concurrently to help Burma address the underlining grievances leading to the mass protests. These grievances are often rooted in poverty and economic under-development, for which China (and neighbouring India) are well placed to help.
It is therefore no surprise that as highlighted in the ATCA article 'Burma in Biggest Uprising in 20 Years: The China Black Swan' of 26 September, 2007, China has stressed the need for stability, issues resolution and national reconciliation in the hope 'that Myanmar will push forward a democracy process that is appropriate for the country'. This would also be in tune with China's desire for gradual development of a perhaps more stable form of democracy, as highlighted by Ambassador Morland's ATCA article of the same date.
Andrew K.P.Leung, SBS, FRSA
www.andrewleunginternationalconsultants.com
