Behind the pomp and circumstance of President Hu’s State Visit, a lot of questions remain puzzling, if not totally unanswered. In what way is Hu’s visit different this time? Why has China recently appeared much more assertive, both economically and militarily? Was President Hu unaware of the test flight of China’s first ‘stealth fighter’? What does a Rising China want? What are China's real ambitions? Can China be ever restrained over Taiwan? How can China be made to bear on North Korea? Why is China so recalcitrant with the value of the renminbi? Why can’t China improve her human rights? The following may help in reading these Chinese tea-leaves.
An emerging classical security dilemma
The Chinese Dragon not only has awakened from her Napoleonic slumber but has grown much larger to claim her rightful place on the world’s top table. There is growing concern, if not fear, that while China has become increasingly convergent economically with the global order, much of her values and international behavior remains at odds. In recent years, mistrust, imperfect understanding and shallow interaction have characterized the relations between the United States as the world’s only super-power and her perceived challenger. A zero-sum game of Security Dilemma (1) is beginning to set in. According to Henry Kissinger, avoiding a US-China Cold War is becoming the greatest challenge in China-US bilateral relations (2).
The J-20
It was widely reported in the West that President Hu appeared to be unaware of the test flight of China’s first ‘stealth fighter’ – the Chengdu J-20 prototype - when the visiting US Defense Secretary Robert Gates broached this subject directly to him. Consequently it was speculated that the Chinese military must have tried to keep the civilian leadership, including President Hu, in the dark. If so, there would be a great deal of ominous implications. However, what this conjecture misses is that several days before the test flight, President Hu’s heir-apparent Vice President Xi Jinping visited the test site to watch the original test flight, which later had to be aborted due to inclement weather. What is more, the unusual timely reporting by China’s media of this military-sensitive event suggests a degree of government connivance, if not deliberate initiative. The purpose was likely to send a calculated indirect warning against perceived increasing US military activism along China’s eastern shores.
What does a Rising China want?
After emerging as a strong nation from ‘centuries of humiliation’ at the mercy of foreign powers, guarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity are at the very heart of China’s ‘core interests’. These underline China’s stand over Taiwan and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. They also support the build-up of China’s military capabilities to safeguard the Asia-Pacific sea-lanes for the transportation of her essential energy and other resources. But this is very different from a presentiment that China may have hegemonic ambitions. There are very good reasons why not. Though growing almost beyond recognition, China is still a poor country ranking below 100 in per capita terms. Some 400 million of her population still live with no more than $2 a day. Moreover, because of the demographics of her One Child Policy, she will grow old before she grows rich. In an increasingly inter-dependent and multi-polar world, a Rising China has to demonstrate to the world, especially her main trading partners, that she means what she says about ‘Peaceful Development’ and ‘Harmonious World’. Nevertheless, as a leading power, she is growing more confident of her ability to defend her core interests. Why does China appear to throw her weight around on occasions? Well, just imagine how difficult it is for a Panda to tiptoe if she has grown to 800-pounds!
The Chinese yuan (renminbi)
Although China is upgrading her industries, volume, low prices and low profit margins still typify most of China’s exports. So any sizeable RMB appreciation is bound to result in widespread joblessness, threatening national stability. True, an increased currency value will expand the purchasing power of China’s masses, thus helping China’s new strategy of promoting domestic consumption to balance her export-driven economy. This is already happening gradually. However, a large proportion of China’s export depends on imported materials and components. Any sizeable currency appreciation will destabilize the economies of many supplier countries forming part and parcel of China’s global production chain. While an increased currency value will also help to reduce domestic inflation, China is reluctant to allow this consideration alone to dictate the RMB’s movement, as she remains confident with her arsenal of monetary and fiscal measures to contain the inflationary beast. In any event, China is redoubling her efforts to internationalize the RMB, through currency swaps, trade settlements, and RMB-demoninated bond issuance. This should pave the way for the Chinese yuan to eventually assume a greater role in the international currency system.
Approach to conflict resolution
With vastly different history, culture, developmental needs and global relationships, China’s approach to international conflict resolution is often at odds with the West. Moreover, lessons such as Vietnam and Iraq have taught China that external coercion may not be as productive as building a more solid economic infrastructure for internal economic development. This informs China’s long-term approach to countries like North Korea, Iran and other problematic countries in Africa, aside from China’s own regional or energy security considerations. That’s why it often appears that China doesn’t do ‘coercions’.
Human Rights
China and the Chinese people are truly proud of having lifted the vast majority of a population the size of a fifth of mankind out of poverty within barely over three decades. To be fair, there has been notable progress in official accountability, transparency, openness, improved governance and legal reform. There has also been unprecedented evolution of a civil society. Volunteerism is becoming more active and spontaneous. There is a burgeoning NGO community with some 350,000 NGOs and numerous unregistered civic groups (3). There is a vibrant (though censored) blogosphere with over 47 million bloggers and a growing Christian community with some 80 million Christians (4). Nevertheless, China often lurches towards repression as a necessary tool ti maintain social stability. As acknowledged by President Hu, China still has a long way to go in safeguarding human rights. What is more, China must realize that economic excellence alone is not enough to gain international recognition as a Great Power.
Way Ahead
The National Intelligence Council Report - Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (5) points out that while the United States will continue to maintain her leadership in the future, her capacity to lead is declining in a changed and complex world with diverse emerging powers and actors. For the first time in over a century, the West’s share of global GDP has dropped to about 50% and is expected to decline to below 40% within a decade. To maintain global leadership, the United States is obliged to work with various key stakeholders outside her traditional allies. None of these stakeholders is more important than a rising China as the world’s largest goods producer and carbon emitter, a leading geopolitical player in regions ranging from the Asia-Pacific, Central Asia to Africa, and a country with increasing military might.
Yet this imperative is often hampered by rivalry, acrimony, misunderstanding and mistrust, compounded by miscommunication and miscalculation. So President Hu’s US visit was most timely in improving US-China relations. What is crucial is not so much the export and investment deals signed during the visit, important though these are, but the establishment of effective channels in promoting mutual understanding and rapport, if not all-weather partnership, in an era of tectonic change.
President Hu suggested five approaches to better US-China relations - working together to expand common grounds while accepting differences in a spirit of equality and mutual trust; promoting deeper economic cooperation; forging strategic partnerships; promoting people-people friendships and regular state-to-state dialogue and visits at the highest levels. These would be empty words unless they are fleshed out by vigorous action. To break the ice, a mutual ‘strategic reassurance’ (6) is needed, more by deeds than by statements of intent. The United States needs to be re-assured that China’s actions do not seek to undermine US leadership in maintaining the global order. Likewise, China needs to be convinced that the United States does not intend to block her rise. There is no substitute to working together on mutually indentified trust-building initiatives.
As the US and China are the world’s two leading powers, nothing less than rapport, or a constructive detente, between them will help navigate the world towards a better future through the turbulent and uncharted waters of the 21st century.
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(1) Security dilemma or Spiral model is a term used in international relations to describe a situation where actions by a state intended to heighten its security, such as increasing its military strength or forming new alliances, can lead other states to respond with similar measures, thereby producing increased tensions and conflicts, even when no side really desires such outcome. See how the Security Dilemma plays out in international politics in such works as China’s Ascent –Power, Security, and the future of International Politics, by Robert S. Ross & Zhu Feng, Editors, Cornell University Press, 2008 and China’s Rise –Challenges and Opportunities, by Bergsten, Freeman, Lardy, and Mitchell, Petersen Institute and CSIS, Washington DC, 2008
(2) Avoiding a US-China Cold War, by Henry Kissinger in The Washington Post, 14 January, 2011
(3) See a study dated October 2007 on NGOs in China published by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research at http://www.aei.org/site-pages/tocqueville-on-china/i-ngos-in-china-an-overview.html (accessed on 20 January, 2011)
(4) See Jesus in Beijing, by David Aikman, Monarch Books, 2005, pp. 6-8.
(5) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, National Intelligence Council, November 2008
(6) The concept of "strategic reassurance" was raised by James Steinberg, US deputy secretary of state, in his speech on 24 September 2009 in which he outlined several areas where China needs to clarify its intentions, including the growth of China’s military power. This was echoed in an article on 29 October 2009 in the People’s Daily Online, saying that China needed such assurance as well over the arms sale to Taiwan, for example. See http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6797307.html (accessed on 21 January, 2011)
