The following is reported in Next Big Future, a science and technology blog on 23 June, 2011:
‘A groundbreaking report analyses 150 countries and 60 years of history, and concludes that rising levels of wealth are entrenching democracy in many emerging markets.
According to the report, Russia is highly likely to become a strong democracy within the next few years; China will become a democracy by 2017; and Kenya and Ghana are set to follow Nigeria towards ever-safer democracy levels. It concludes that trade and investment in “non-democracies” should be increased, rather than imposing sanctions on them.
The report asserts that democracies are “immortal” above the per-capita GDP level of $10,000, which probably now includes Mexico, Brazil and Turkey, as well as all EU member states and South Korea. It notes that autocracies have less chance of becoming democracies than vice-versa up to the $3,500 per-capita GDP level; and that rising income levels will lead to democracy unless the country is an energy exporter. “Controversially, it would appear that trade, investment and even tourism to foster growth is a better policy option than sanctions for Western governments hoping to promote democracy in non-energy exporting states,” the report concludes.’
See http://nextbigfuture.com/2011/06/economist-predicts-that-china-will-be.html#more
The prediction that China will become a democracy by 2017 comes from Charles Robertson, chief economist of Renaissance Capital.
It is true that demands for democracy will grow with higher income levels. But this linear projection is flawed in the case of China for the following reasons -
First, size of the economy and GDP per capita can be highly misleading. Although Golman Sachs forecasts China's economy to overtake the US by 2027, her GDP per capita still ranks about 100th, amongst some of the poorest countries in Africa. This is what Premier Wen Jiabao refers to as the paradox of 1.3 billion people. What appears as a big economy comes to peanuts when divided by that number and what appears to be a small problem can become colossal when multiplied by that number.
Second, the driver for democracy is generally the more educated middle-class. A study in McKinsey Quarterly (2006) indicates that the annual household income cohort RMB 100,001 (US$15,459) to 200,000 is expected to jump from 9.8% of the total in 2005 to 36.4% by 2025. Many people will become much happier financially but that level of income at that % proportion by 2025 hardly justifies the Roberson prediction.
Third, similarly, democracy may become more likely when a country's economy becomes more consumer-oriented. Consumption now only accounts for 34% China's economy. Stephen Roach, Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and author of 'The Next Asia (John Wiley and Sons, 2009) reckons the growth of China's consumption in the next few decades could be as fast as 1% of GDP a year. That will take anothe 16 years from now for China's economy to have just 50% represented by consumption. That will be exactly 2027, when Goldman Sachs thinks China's seconomy will overtake the US, which may provide an opportunity for China to turn more democratic. That is still 10 years after Robertson's chosen date.
Fourth, I used the word 'more' advisedly. President Hu used the 'D' word 61 times in his open address at the CPC Congress in 2007. 'Democracy' is in fact mentioned in the Chinese Constitution, though, irconically, not in the Constitution chartered by American's Founding Fathers, according to Steve Hanke, a celebrated Professor of Apllied Economics with John Hopkins Univerity and Senior Fellow of the Cato Institute. Indeed, China has become much more 'democratic' compared with the days of Chairman Mao. There is no doubt that this progress will continue. For example, there are more open and genuine elections at the village level (in fact covering the majority of China's population). But that is not to say China is necessarily heading to the Western multi-party adversarial model of democracy.
Fifth, recent performance of Western adversarial politics, such as the current paralysis in the US Congress, only serves to reinforce the conviction of Chinese leaders that it's best to develop China's own model of democracy.
Sixth, regardless of any repressions, cults and separatists, there is as yet no widely-based politcal movement for change and no alternative political party or figure exist. It is difficult to imagine that by 2017, things could have evolved so dramatically for a country of 1.3 billion people with diverse interests and developments in 32 provinces, municipalities, 2 special adminstrative regions, and 56 ethnic groups.
Seventh, the Chinese Communist Party is not exactly unpopular, winning the highest ratings in the world in independent surveys of how people feel their country is going, accordig to successive PEW surveys over the past few decades. Those who like Collapse theories may wish to visit my research note 'Why the Chinese Communist Party may last longer than you think: A closer look at the China Threat and China Collapse theories' at http://www.andrewleunginternationalconsultants.com/files/…
Last but not least, having said all that, I just want to make the point that political development seldom lends itself to economic projections. China is changing all the time and there are may imponderables. I don't think anyone is qualified to predict a date, perhaps not even the Chinese leaders themselves.
Andrew
www.andrewleunginternationalconsultants.com
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