Bo Xilai, a top Chinese "princeling" and Party-Secretary of Chongqing, China's fastest-growing and largest provincial-level municipality of over 30 million inhabitants, has abruptly fallen from grace, after a Hollywood-style quick-action drama featuring his top aide fleeing for asylum in an American consulate in the capital city of Chengdu 170 miles away. The curious case of Bo Xilai has attracted a great deal of Western commentaries, including that in the New York Times. Click here
Some Western observers tend to analyze this extraordinary saga as a power struggle between the so-called conservatives and reformists, and/or between the power camps of the so-called princelings and the Communist Youth League (which is the powerbase of China's current President Hu Jintao).
The first problem of such analysis is that Xi Jinping, the next President-in-waiting, is by definition a princeling.
So if the princeling group sticks together and there is such a power struggle within the Party, how could Bo Xilai, a princeling with such an impressive track record, be sacked?
In spite of Bo's alleged faults, he did a wonderful job during his time in Dalian turning it into the dynamic and green city of today. His anti-crime campaign in Chongqing was legendary and won the hearts and minds of many ordinary citizens. Under his watch, the so-called "Chongqing Model" is beginning to be the talk of the town, as an example of fast growth combined with an exotic mixture of "Singing red praises" of Communist revolutionary fervour and "Striking at the black (criminal) elements".
Is it simply because Bo was too brilliantly meritorious such that he was a victim of his own success? Hardly, otherwise by discouraging excellence, the Party would be increasingly staffed by mediocrity and risk eventual death by atrophy. Indeed, China's remarkable economic success during the past three decades would not have come about with this mindset.
Some observers labour over the wealth distribution agenda and associate it with Bo Xilai. This is simply untrue. The latest Five Year Plan (2011-15) sets the direction of the collective leadership, including princelings (like Xi) and the Communist Youth League. The direction is to create a more equitable, more balanced and sustainable society. Wealth re-distribution is at the very heart of this Five Year Plan. It is by no means the product of any single leader, let alone Bo Xilai, who has not made it into the Politburo Standing Committee, China's state cabinet.
Some say that Bo harbours ambitions far beyond mere elevation to the Politburo Standing Committee. Perhaps it is his suspected scheming behind the scene that eventually got him into trouble. Others highlighted the allegations of his own corruption through a "front" of his wife's well-camouflaged law firm located in Beijing, which has been under quiet official investigation. Also coming into the open are unsettling concerns of the way the so-called "Chongqing Model" went about the "Strike Black" campaign, flouting the rule of law and resorting to all sorts of strong-armed tactics remininicent of the Cultural Revolution. The "Strike Black" campaign was also accused of being used as an intrument to topple Bo's political opponents and to extort the transfer of wealth to feather his own nest. The "Chongqing Model" of reckless pursuit of economic growth at all costs has also been criticized.
These latest criticisms are coming to the surface including a piece by Wu Jinglian, one of China's best-known and well-connected liberal economists, which is reported in the South China Morning Post on 26 March. Click here
It is noteworthy that writing in China Reform, an influential magazine in China, Wu warned of two sets of competing forces: one between the development of rule of law and crony capitalism; the other between reform and revolution. He also praised the Wukang Village experiment in democracy through open and fair elections, which was driven by Wang Yang, Party Secretary of Guangdong Province who is a rising star tipped to vie with Bo for a seat in the 9-person Politburo Standing Committee.
One day before Bo was sacked, when meeting the international press for three solid hours after the annual NPC/CPPCC sessions, Premier Wen gave a very good hint why Bo had to be removed.
The Premier stared into the camera and said he was deeply worried that if reform was not steered properly, the spectre of the Cultural Revolution could well return to haunt the Chinese people. With these remarks, Premier Wen is the first Chinese leader who openly refers to the political convulsions of the Cultural Revolution.
So it is clear which side of Bo's doubt-act the Premier is particularly worried about - "Singing the Red" or "Striking at the Black".
It is also clear that Bo's abrupt removal could not have happened without the support of Xi Jinping as the next President-in-waiting.
The point is that in any other political system, there are always vested interests and affiliations. In China no affiliation wants to pursue its own agenda at the risk of rocking the entire boat capsizing everybody. A perceived ideological movement with gimmicks harking back to the most destructive period of the Chinese Communist Party is seen by all the powers-that-be as precisely such a risk, especially coming from someone suspected of organized corruption and hidden ambitions.
Also not in the public eye was what actually happened for 24 hours inside the American consulate in Chengdu where Bo's right-hand man Wang Lijun sought refuge. Some rumours had it that a secret CD disc was handed over. The subsequent investigation was put entirely in the hands of Beijing's National Security Bureau. Both Beijing and Washington have since kept mum about the details. In any event, Beijing is unlikely to be comfortable with someone like Bo remaining in the heart of the Party leadership whose personal and other Party secrets may well have passed into the hands of China's perceived mightiest adversary.
So explaining the Bo Xilai affair simply as a triumph of reformists over leftists is perhaps as over-simplifying as a struggle between the Communist Youth League and the princelings.
China's leadership now rests on collective ownership, based on competitive meritocracy rather than ideology. Like any other political system, there is of course a measure of sharing of vested interests but the common aim to keep the Party-boat afloat trumps any internal divisions.