CHINAwatch

Maverick Officials and Blind Dissidents in China's Transition Year

Radio interview on 9 May 2012 on Voice of Russia in London with a panel of other interviewees - Martin Jacques, author of "When China Rules the World", Marta Cooper, a journalist who works at Index on Censorship, and Jonas Parello-Plesner, an analyst from the European Council on Foreign Relations.

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How are China's top leaders selected and how stable is China's Communist Party?

China’s high-profile Bo Xilai affair was followed immediately by a international saga of an escaped blind human rights activist Chen Guangcheng into the American embassy in Beijing. Amidst a sense of political unease and uncertainty, there was speculation that the scheduled 18^th five-yearly Party Congress set to endorse the next top leadership line-up was to be delayed from September or October, to between November and January.

It is no surprise that Western observers have become increasingly perplexed, wondering how stable is the Chinese leadership and how the inter sanctum of China’s Communist Party, the Zhongnanhai, is formed and how it actually works.

A recent three-part series in Foreign Policy may offer a good glimpse of some of the political dynamics at work.

In Power Shift in China Part I, dated 16 April, 2012, Cheng Li, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Centre, highlights three parallel trends in China’s shifting power - “Weak leaders, strong factions”, “Weak government, strong interest groups”, and, paradoxically, “Weak party, strong country”.  Click here

The first power shift suggests that the days of a supreme or all-powerful leader like Mao or Deng are long gone. The current two competing camps – on the one hand, the so-called “elitists”, represented by princelings who trumpet economic growth and on the other, “populists”, represented by the Communist Youth League (known as the tuanpai), who promote social justice and social cohesion – have reached “a near perfect balance” of power, according to Cheng Li. This can be seen in the very line-up of the next top two leaders – the President-in-waiting Xi Jinping, a princeling, and the Premier-in-waiting, Li Keqiang, supported by the tuanpai.  

This delicate balance is likely to be borne out in the coming membership re-shuffle of a new-term Politburo Standing Committee (comprising China’s top nine leaders). See Ajai Shukla’s article “Who after Hu ... and Wen?” in the Business Standard of 10 January, 2012. Click here

The second power shift highlighted by Cheng Li is one towards interest groups represented by local governments, key state-owned enterprises and powerful business sectors such as property.

Although the first and second power shifts may cause tension and uncertainty at times, a negotiated balance of competing politics and vested interests is not unlike the dynamics in any advanced country. As Cheng Li points out, this should be considered an encouraging development as the country transitions to democracy.

The third power shift suggests that despite the party’s lack of political legitimacy, the country’s global economic and geopolitical influence continues to grow, because of, according to Cheng Li, “the maturity of Chinese society and the country’s strength.” 

However, Li’s assertion here calls into question his reference to “weak leaders”, “weak government”, and “weak party” running through his three power shifts. These alleged weaknesses seem to suggest that the choice of China’s President and Premier is no more than an expedient and unstable compromise between two fractious, opposing camps. If this were true , over the past ten-year term of office, the leadership would not have been as decisively effective as it has proved in successfully guiding China through various shocks including SARS, the Sichuan earthquake, and the ravages of the global financial crisis. These achievements are unlikely to have come about just because of “the maturity of Chinese society and the country’s strength.” in the absence of a strong leadership, strong government and a strong Party.

So what makes for this strength of China’s body politic in spite of apparently opposing camps?  To answer this question, it is essential to understand how China’s top leaders are selected.

As in the case of Western coalition governments, some horse-trading naturally occurs. This happens well before the ultimate hurdle of the Politburo,through the various stepping stones such as appointments as party secretaries or important ministers. The process is by definition extremely competitive, depending on political connections as much as meritocracy.  By the time the Standing Committee membership is finalized, a blue-print of a broad consensus would have already been formed, a consensus not only of political compromise, but also of broad-based trust and confidence that certain individuals who have come through the ranks have demonstrated their governing abilities and political wherewithal to lead the Party system forward. This competitive and yet meritocratic process supports the stability of the Party. Any personal ambition at the expense of the Party’s stability is likely to be strongly resisted and fought against by the vast majority.

This is how China’s top leaders emerge. The process is a form of intra-Party selection, drawn out over a long period well before the final contenders reach the final hurdle. The final outcome will have been, in a way, shaped and determined by this process rather than just a matter of white smoke from the chimney of the Sistine Chapel.

In Power Shift in China Part III, dated 20 April, 2012, Susan Shirk, chair of the 21st Century China Program at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, and a former US deputy assistant secretary of state with the Clinton administration, suggests that China could with advantage replace the current secretive leadership selection process with a more open intra-Central Committee election. Click here

Nevertheless, as with many “elections” within or outside China, the outcome is more likely to have been determined in advance by a broad consensus built up over a period of time before the election event rather than the result of decisions on the spur of the moment. To that extent, the outcome would  be the same as achieved under the current intra-party selection process, although the event would then be formally called an intra-party election.

Regardless of what form the leadership selection process may take, how stable is the Party now, given the recent turn of events?

The Party now seems at a crossroads. The leadership is seeing the writing on the wall. The Party’s lack of legitimacy is beginning to undermine its stability exemplified by the rising level of social unrests, the political cracks unveiled by the Bo Xilai affair, and the clueless response to a tide of liberal aspirations from China’s rising middle-class who are now better educated and internet-savvy.

Heralded by a ground-breaking 12^th Five Year Plan (2011-15) designed to build a more balanced, equitable, and sustainable economy and society, further change is very much in the air in the form of a recently-released 468-page World Bank report jointly undertaken with the Development Research Centre of the State Council, entitled  "China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society", of which Vice Premier Li Keqiang is known to be a staunch supporter. Amongst other things, the World Bank report addresses the reform of state-owned enterprises, relationship between local governments and the centre, improved governance, civil society, and sustainable development. Click here

Moreover, following the Wukan affair, the momentum towards a more open, transparent, free and fair electoral process at the village level is likely to be set in train nationwide if, as predicted, the model's promoter, Guangdong provincial party secretary Wang Yang, gains a seat in the Politburo Standing Committee as a rival of Bo Xilai. He has already insinuated that the model can be rolled out throughout his Province. As a top leadership aspirant, Wang would not have personally mounted such a high-profile act without some tacit understanding with the top leaders that a nation-wide replication of the Wukan model is politically doable and welcome. If this should come to pass, the democracy impact on China’s society cannot be over-estimated as villages represent a good half of China’s entire population.

Additionally, most of the corruption, administrative abuse and resultant social malaise is symptomatic of a deficit in the rule of law, in the absence of a more independent judiciary as local judges are appointed by local officials. Guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary through a central appointment system controlled by Beijing may serve to cure some of the social ills.

Last but not least, the leadership has been watching the rise of the Arab Spring with justified apprehension. Throughout the world, a more educated and internet-savvy middle class citizenry is demanding to be heard and its interests and aspirations addressed. Churning out 7 million university graduates a year, China’s own burgeoning middle class is expected to rise from less than a quarter to 50% of the population (nearly 700 million people) by 2025. The bubbling micro-blogging community, numbering 250 million, and the recent spate of disgruntled artists and activists are clear signs that the existing control-centric governance may be near its sell-by date.

All told, these reforms, if successfully implemented, are likely to usher in a more balanced, more open, more equitable, more sustainable, and in essence, more democratic society in China. The prognosis on the likelihood of this outcome may become clearer once the next top leadership line-up is announced at the coming 18^th Party Congress, whenever it is held.

Minxin Pei: Communist China's Perilous Phase

Writing for the Wall Street Journal, Minxin Pei, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, outlines in a broader historical context why the Communist Party of China is entering a perilous phase in the light of various political scandals and fallout in recent months, including the latest saga of the escape of a blind activist into the Beijing American embassy. Click here

The writing is clearly on the wall, both inside and outside China, including rising levels of social discontent, the Wukan village confrontation, the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement. Indeed, both President Hu and Premier Wen have invoked the "D" word openly many times before. But the recent scandals of Bo Xilai and the case of the escaped blind activist are a sobre reminder that political reform now assumes an urgency that can be ignored at the cost of the regime's survival.

Pei is perhaps right about the first two of his three magic numbers when democracy is bound to happen - (a) when a country's GDP per capita reaches $6,000 in PPP terms (b) when a single-party rule has reached its 74th year and (c) when the Party system fails to accomodate more than one-seventh of its elite (by absorbing them into the Party).

As for (a), it is no doubt true that a single-party rule has to accommodate the aspirations of a rising middle-class commitant with the $6000 per capita threshold of economic development. China's GDP per capita is now $8382 in PPP terms. So democracy should be long overdue. In his analysis, Pei counts Singapore as a one-party state as the same party wins elections every time since the country's independence in 1965. But Singapore's GDP per capita in PPP terms has reached $59,711, even ahead of the United States at $48,387. As the situation in Singapore appears to be fairly stable, it seems that the same government can continue to govern well if it keeps on meeting the changing needs and aspirations of most of its people.

As for (b), the 74th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in power will be in 2023, near the time when China will have added 350 million more urbanites (by 2025, according to McKisney's) or when China will have overtaken the United States as the largest economy in the world (in nominal terms) (by 2027, according to Goldman Sachs or by 2018, according to The Economist. Click here

It is therefore likely and indeed imperative that China needs to change her governance in keeping with the times and the make-up of her population and economy.

As for (c), the Communist Party now numbers 80 million members. It is true that not everyone can be a Party member and the vast majority of government officials are Members. But two non-CP members became appointed as Ministers - Minister for Science and Technoology and Mininster for Health. Indeed, with China's red-hot economy, not everyone wants to join the Party as for many the economy holds far greater attractions. So just looking at the size of the CP gives no clue as to how the aspirations of China's univeristy-educated middle class are being met or fail to be met. Indeed, if it is freedom and liberty that a rising middle class seeks, such aspirations are more likely to be met outside rather than inside the Party.

There is no definitive answer as to what immediate moves the Party may take. But what is certain is that China is unlikely to just download the Western system of rival multi-party system which seems to have ended up in political gridlock in various countries, let alone the fact that it also fails to avoid the destabilizing 1% - 99% phenomenon.

In the light of China's recent political fallout, it seeems that the next leadership is likely to push ahead with more open, transparent and fair elections at the village level following the recent Wukan model. That would give about half of China's 1.3 billion people a taste of true democracy.

It is also likely that the judiciary may become more independent, to be appointed at the cental level rather than by local authorities. That would act as a check on some of the abuse of power at the local level.

Third, intra-Party discipline and democracy are likely to be emphasized so as to subject officials, regardless of rank, to greater public monitoring and accountability.

Last but not least, it is likely that the 468-page report ""China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society" undertaken jointly by the World Bank and the Development Research Centre of the State Council will be implemented, ushering in much needed reforms of the state-owned enterprises, more clearly defining local government responsibilities, promotion of civil society, and improvement of governance at all levels. Click here

All of the above, however, may well fall far short of peoples' expectations. But with 170 million peasants still living at no more than $1.25 a day and so much of the economic and political system hanging on a fine balance, China is likely to continue "to feel for the stepping stones in crosssing the river".

More will be revealed when the next leadership eventually takes shape in October 2012. Watch this space.

Best regards,

Andrew