In an article dated 8 February, 2013 for The Diplomat, an online international current-affairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific region, Trefor Moss, an independent journalist based in Hong Kong and formerly Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly, opined that there are seven reasons why China and Japan won’t go to war even as tensions are escalating.
Moss thinks that “ if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit”.
The seven reasons are mostly China’s huge constraints : (1) a nightmare possibility for China of an ignominious defeat (2) mutual economic dependence (3) doubts about China’s military readiness (4) unsettled politics in China (5) unknown quantity of U.S. intervention (6) China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation and (7) China’s hard-earned peaceful development image.
Moss’most operative words for Japan are -
(a) "Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far"; and
(b) "It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget".
As for (a), notwithstanding the many valid constraints on China's military option, Moss misses the critical issue of mounting nationalism of the Chinese people, especially against an old foe who is popularly perceived as not showing any genuine atonement for its atrocious past war crimes. Coupled with centuries of national humiliation in having territories and sea-port concessions seized at gun-point, this is an overwhelming historical baggage that no Chinese leaders could afford to treat with less than the full might of the nation if things are pushed too far.
As for (b), China knows too well that the current regional anti-China confrontation largely follows the recent American pivot to Asia. Although the diplomatic word preferred by the United States is now "re-balancing", China cannot help but feel that this is a trap to embroil, if not contain, the nation by getting China caught in a regional war at a time when it has yet to achieve its goal of becoming a middle-income country. Such a regional war is bound to involve the United States and possibly some of its allies in the Asia-Pacific. So why should China choose to fall into this trap of a potential war of attrition if the country can wait for another five or ten years when China's comprehensive strength would have built up from doubling her economy?
Last and certainly not least, the biggest prize of all for China is not the tiny Diaoyu/Senkaku islands but Taiwan. Strait-relations are now on a peaceful course with the two sides increasingly linked economically, socially, and financially. Witness the latest move by Taiwan to position itself as another offshore centre for the internationalization of the RMB. The prognosis for Taiwan coming back to China’s fold in one form or another in the not-so-distant future has become more hopeful. In “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power”(Basic Books, 2012), Zbigniew Brzezinski, a doyen of American foreign policy, sees as historically inevitable that Taiwan may form some sort of a more formal re-association with Mainland China subject to satisfactory arrangements to preserve its distinctive political, social, and military identity.Click here If China is involved in a regional war now, this would dash the hope of a peaceful unification by another name for a fairly long time, if not indefinitely.
So I agree with Moss that China doesn’t want a war, at least or now, but for some other more cogent considerations.
That’s the more reason why China would be well advised to put in place mechanisms, including diplomatic mediation through the United Nations, to prevent unintended consequences whereby China has no choice but to respond militarily and risk triggering a “security spiral” escalating into a full-blown war.
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