(The following is my original text of my Op-ed published in the South China Morning Post of 9 November, 2015 with the tagline How a softer approach by the US to balancing a rising China could pay dividends)
America has vowed to continue Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) such as conducted by USS Larsen to challenge China’s island-building activities in the South China Sea under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1) Click here This is part of America’s Asia-Pacific military strategy to maintain freedom of navigation and to “re-balance” against a more assertive China.
The stakes are high on both sides. America wants to pre-empt the risk, however far-fetched, of China imposing a “Monroe Doctrine ” in the Asia Pacific (2). Besides the Malacca Strait choke-point controlled by the Seventh Fleet, US power projection has been fortified by stronger regional military alliances, including joint naval exercises. The “Asia Pivot” aims to deploy 60% of global US naval assets to the region by 2020. Meanwhile, reminiscent of the kind of “outsourced balancing” theorized by Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) (3), Japan has revised her pacifist Constitution to permit “collective self-defence” with allies including the United States. Balancing against China is clearly the unspoken agenda.
For China, the South China Sea is not just about territorial integrity, an inviolable “core interest”. It is also about vital sea lanes of communication for trade and import of resources, on which national security and regime stability depend. China has long been uncomfortable with perceived encirclement by “island chains” imposed by US navies operating from Okinawa and Guam. Decades of phenomenal economic growth have enabled China to upgrade a wide range of asymmetric military capabilities, including survivable long-range nuclear deterrence, a burgeoning blue-ocean navy with nuclear submarines, mobile anti-satellite and “aircraft-killer” precision-guided missiles, cyber-warfare, and integrated warfare capabilities including Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD), and Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C2ISR). China now feels confident in safeguarding vital sea lanes in the Dongsha (Pratas) Islands, the Xishha (Paracel) Islands, and the Nansha (Spratley) Islands, critical choke points in the South China Sea. The intention to project naval power for national defence is clear in China’s first-ever White Paper on Military Strategy published in May (4).
Nevertheless, both sides are wary of dangers of unintended escalation to an all-out war. A major conventional war in the region, let alone nuclear Armageddon, is not something either wants to contemplate, least of all their own peoples or other regional neighbours. Both agree on the imperative of crisis management and continuing military-to-military dialogue according to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) (5). Click here
The other theatre of US-China hard-power tussle is economic. The recently-concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) of 12 nations representing 40% of global economy excludes China. The aim is to form a US-led economic coalition with higher standards for labour, environment, and level-playing field before China can join. In addition, the United States is negotiating the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to form the world’s largest free-trade bloc with the European Union.
China’s trump card is economic centrality firmly locked into the global production and value chain. Look carefully into any gadget and one will find China embedded. Six of the top eight container ports are located in China, including Hong Kong. Moreover, there is an alphabet-soup of bilateral or regional free trade agreements where China already enjoys a central role. One notable example is the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area effective 1st January, 2010. Under active negotiation is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) comprising all ASEAN members and their free-trade partners. Following Premier Li Keqiang’s recent visit, a bilateral free trade agreement with South Korea is expected by year end (6). Click here Additionally, China continues to push for a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP).
The scale and centrality of China’s economic linkages are unlikely to change very much as a result of exclusive trade agreements or military alliances. Few, if any, of America’s military allies want to choose between the two great powers, as virtually all rely on China for markets and jobs.
It is also becoming clear to the European Union which side their bread is likely to be buttered. Recall how quickly the United Kingdom, a key US ally, jumped on the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) bandwagon. The UK has recently greeted President Xi’s state visit with uncharacteristic pomp and circumstance. This was followed in a matter of weeks by visits to Beijing of German Chancellor Merkel, President Hollande of France, and King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands.
China’s new One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative offers an ambitious blueprint linking the nation’s vast market to Europe, Central Asia and Eurasia, including potential investments in high-speed rail, ports and expressways. The collapse of energy prices worldwide has deepened China’s pockets. OBOR is also calculated to open up alternative routes for flows of energy, minerals, trade and investment, bypassing the choke points in the South China Sea.
A more promising theatre to balance against a rising China, however, is institutional. The TPP is partly designed to spread adherence to higher standards. Future OBOR economic linkages with Western Europe will also offer many opportunities for assimilating China into global values and norms.
Moreover, China has embraced the world in knowledge and education. The nation is churning out some 7 million university graduates a year, adding up to some 200 million graduates by 2030 (7). Click here Many will have been educated abroad in Western universities. According to the Institute of International Education (IIE), 274,439 students from China studied in the United States in 2013/14, 16.5% more than the previous year. (8) Click here At the same time, China is changing course towards a more sustainable model of development, including innovation, higher value-added production, greener economy, a more equitable and inclusive society, and the rule of law. There will be a cornucopia of opportunities for bridging differences in ideas and value systems. Recent academic interest in China in studying the Magna Carta during its 800th anniversary is a case in point (9). Click here
The Cold War mindset is passé. Aircraft carriers and supersonic bombers cannot sustain economic growth, job creation and social stability. Nor can they change a “flat” world (10) where the United States and China increasingly share common interests ranging from trade, investment, currencies, nuclear non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, climate change, to global governance. During his state visit to the United States, President Xi stressed that the so-called “Thucydides Trap” engulfing past rival great powers needs not be repeated in the 21st century. (11) Click here In an inter-connected and inter-dependent world, power can be projected as much, if not more, by value systems as by military dominance or economic connectivity.
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(1) Lassen Faire in the South China Sea: Takeaways From the First US FONOP, The Diplomat, 28 October 2015
(2) China’s Monroe Doctrine, New York Times, 8 May, 2015
(3) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John J Mearsheimer, University of Chicago, Norton: New York and London, 2001(“balancing and buck-passing”, p.13, Introduction)
(4) The Big Story Behind China’s New Military Strategy, The Diplomat, 5 June, 2015
(5) China naval chief says minor incident could spark war in South China Sea, Reuters 30 October,
(6) Premier Li's visit boosts China-South Korea ties, promotes detente with Japan, China Daily, 3 November, 2015
(7) The Competition that Really Matters - Comparing U.S., Chinese, and Indian Investments in the Next-Generation Workforce, Centre for American Progress, 21 August, 2012
(8) Chinese enrollment in the US shifting increasingly to undergraduate studies, ICEF Monitor, 27 May, 2015
(9) China and Magna Carta - How Chinese view the historic document – and their own Constitution. The Diplomat, 23 July, 2015
(10) The World is Flat, Thomas Friedman, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005
(11) China Voice: Ten reasons China, U.S. can avoid Thucydides Trap, Xinhua News, 27 September, 2015