CHINAwatch

Premiere Li Qiang's 3-party talks in Seoul with Japan and South Korea

Exclusive live Live TV interview on TRT World on 27 May, 2024.

 

 

 

Anti-China Cold War, TikTok, Ukraine, Gaza - video interviews with Izvestia

Izvestia is Russia's offical news media covering foreign relations. The following are exclusive recorded interviews (in English) on 6 May 2024 for voiced-over broadcast in Russia. Cold War, TikTok, Ukraine, Gaza  Trump factor  

Xi Jinping's Europe visit implications

Backchat of 10 May 2024 on RTHK (Radio Television Hong Kong) with Prof Joseph Mahoney of East China Normal University, Shanghai, and Professor John Burns of The University of Hong Kong. (My intervention starts from time counter 10:35 in the top bar) 

What does President Xi's visit to Europe signify?

Recorded exclusive interview (in English) with NTV of Russia on 9 May 2024

Challenges and Prospects of the Chinese Economy: an exclusive in-depth video interview with Rome-based World Geostrategic Insights

Video interview of 8 May 2024 with Rome-based World Geostrategic Insights . YouTube link

The online lady interviewer hails from Istanbul, Turkey. 

How the US Keeps Fighting China, Knowing It Won’t Win?

The US has no Plan B, says Professor Radhika Desai, Director of the Geopolitical Economy Research Group, University of Manitoba, on the YouTube Thinkers Forum on 25 January 2024. She goes over paradigm shifts in 2023 on America's hegemony, including Ukraine and Gaza; the long-term impact on US's own economy; Russia's resilience against US-led pushback; questionable durability of the "casino-like" open-market dollar-system; the future of US-China relations; China's more restrained and globally-inclusive diplomatic stance; and the upcoming impactful elections in the United States and the United Kingdom. 

I should add that America's so-called Plan A against China has only four blunt coercive tools: (a) US military dominance, (b) US technological lead, (c) the weaponized dollar, and (d) America's so-called global alliance-network. These are proving less and less effective against China. 

As for (a), China has vastly expanded its military on all fronts. While unwilling and unable to match America's global military presence and supremacy, Chins is well capable of defending its core interests. This includes a mobile, hypersonic, nuclear-capable Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) System with multiple, separately-navigable warheads, a blue-water navy with more warships than the United States, state-of-the-art fifth-generation fighter planes and bombers, not to mention cyberwarfare and AI expertise. 

As for (b), nano-semiconductor-chips excepted for the time being, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has found that China is leading in 37 out of 44 21st-century cutting-edge technologies. Albeit excluded from the US-led International Space Station project from the very start, which is near the end of its useful life, China has succeed in building and operating its own Tiangong Space Station from scratch. It is the only country able to send a successful robotic probe to the far side of the moon. Its lunar program is picking up speed, partnering with other nations including some advanced countries. 

As for (c), indiscriminate long-arm dollar sanctions have pushed countries in the Global South to bypass the risks of exposure to a weaponized dollar. Some are beginning to transact bilateral trade with China using other currencies including the Renminbi. China's digital sovereign currency (e-CNY) is gaining traction internationally. After all, China is by far the world's largest trader and manufacturer. It remains the larger trading partner for 128 countries compared with America's 57. Seven of the world's top 11 container ports are in China, including Hong Kong. Even not "Made in China", China is embedded in myriad products across the globe, including materials. minerals, components and logistics, decoupling or de-risking regardless. 

As for (d), marginalized for decades under US hegemony, the Global South has become more able to defend their national sovereignty and strategic interests. Witness the massive Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) comprising ASEAN countries and their main trading partners. Absent the United States, this is the world's largest free trade bloc representing a third of global GDP and a third of world population, where China remains a central trading hub.  More developing countries have also chosen to join the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Group as well as the Eurasian Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) where China and Russia hold sway. Witness also the more independent tilt of the Middle East and even India. Fact is, most nations in the Global South don't want to be forced to choose between America and China, which remains a key source for economic development, including trade and infrastructure.

The fixation on coercion to serve American interests often ignores stark realities, includinjg Adam Smith's ''comparative advantage". China has been buying a lot of international passenger jets from Boeing and Airbus, as it has yet no comparable alternatives. However, as China is the world's largest manufacturer, the reverse is true for most of China's manufacturing ouput, including its fully-integrated shipbuilding production chains. According to a report of 19 April in Foreign Policy, Chinese businesses manufacture  96 percent of the world’s dry cargo shipping containers. A single Chinese firm, ZPMC, claims that it supplies  70 percent of the world’s cargo cranes. This compares to U.S.shipyards manufacturing fewer than 1 percent of the cargo vessels that ply the global seas. Using coercive sanctions to turn the table is fanciful. 

All in all, as pointed out by Professor Desai, the days of American hegemony are numbered. The sooner America's elites wake up from their pipe-dream of perpetuating American hegemony through brute coercion, the better would be the propsects for a more inclusive and peaceful world, where the United States can still play a crucial role.   

China: Keeping the dragon awake

The above February 2024 report by Allianz Research, part of the global Allianz Group hearquartered in Germany, confirms China's resilient yet slowing economy in search of new drivers for long-term growth.  Download 2024-02-07-China - Allianz

In particular,  

(a) China is heading towards lower trend growth. China's US$17.52 economy (2023), the world's second largest, cannot be expected to continue past high-digit growth indefinitely. Just look at America's trend growth rates in recent decades. 

(b) In 2023, residential completions came in at 724mn square meters (+16% y/y), outpacing for the first time the volume of housing starts (693mn square meters, -21% y/y). This has helped reduce inventories and stabilize prices at the national level. The ongoing crisis may be a necessary adjustment towards a low-growth but more sustainable property market. Beyond the ongoing crisis, the rapidly aging and shrinking population, coupled with slowing urbanization, puts a brake on the long-term growth of the real estate sector. 

(c) With its real estate and foreign investment engines sputtering, China desperately needs new drivers of growth.  The target is for higher value-added manufacturing such as the ‘New Three’ industries of electric vehicles, batteries and solar energy products. .

(d) Exports are still going strong. Supporting the nation's growth, China's centrality in the global supply and value chain remains robust, de-coupling or de-risking regardless. The intensity of critical dependencies on China varies across importers, with the US being the most exposed: nearly 50% of its imports from China are critical dependencies. A shift in concentration of critical dependencies towards higher value-added sectors is clearly visible, especially when it comes to EU imports from China.

(e) According to ASPI's March 2023 Critical Technology Tracker, China is leading by far in research breakthroughs related to critical technologies, but the translation into manufacturing is not yet clear in all cases.

(f) Chinese competitive electric vehicles (EVs) have taken the world by storm in just a few years. China is becoming the "New Detroit" for EVs globally. 

(g) China accounts for more than 80% of the global solar module manufacturing capacity and more than 80% of solar cell exports. It has the largest installed renewable capacity, exceeding 228 gigawatts (GW), more than the rest of the world combined, well ahead of the nation's original 2030 target. This trajectory reflects a broader strategic shift towards securing a dominant position in the global energy transition and making clean technology a cornerstone of national industrial policy. 

(h) The comparison with Japan's "Lost Decade" is overhyped. China’s GDP per capita is roughly 40% of that of Japan in 1991, suggesting significant further room for growth. China’s urbanization rate currently stands at 66%, still a long way from the 78% observed in 1991 Japan. The Chinese economy can still rely to some extent on exports. Unlike 1991 Japan, China does not have an equity market bubble and its capital account is not fully liberlaized. 

(i) Further pockets of growth could be found on the consumer side. Policies to strengthen the social safety net and increased public spending in healthcare and pension-related services would most likely allow Chinese households to save less and consume more. However, comprensive policy support seems to be lacking for now.

(j) Watch out for intensified headwinds such as chips war, protectionism, geopolitical tensions and the risk of creating other situations of excess capacities, inventories and leverage.