Stephen Olson's piece of 15 February, 2019 in The Diplomat poses three begging questions about the US-China trade war.
First, on top of Germany’s existing Industry 4.0 program, "just--released German National Industry Strategy 2030 signals a growing consensus in Germany that in order to respond to China’s challenge, government needs to be more proactive in fostering and supporting critical strategic industries. The strategy calls for, among other things, state investment in important technology firms to prevent them from being acquired by foreign entities." This begs the question why the "Made in China 2025" strategy is singled out as being unfair.
Second, the now-disallowed "merger between Siemens and the French giant Alstom was explicitly presented as necessary to permit Europe to compete against China’s state-backed national champions. Discussions are now underway as to whether EU antitrust policies need to be relaxed in order to allow greater latitude to meet the challenge posed by Chinese mega-firms. The implications are clear: as concerns over China mount, regulatory frameworks are being rethought, and state-directed industrial policies are gaining ground." "Ironically, the conventional wisdom at the time of China’s entry into the WTO was that China would inevitably become more like the West. But could some countries in the West actually end up becoming more like China?"
Third, the Office of the United States Trade Representative has just completed its annually mandated report to Congress, cataloging a "variety of ways that China’s WTO compliance has fallen short," contrary to "optimistic hopes and aspirations held by the West at the time of China’s WTO accession." "And while there has been widespread global consternation over the unilateral U.S. application of punitive tariffs in response to China’s trade practices, there is also an underlying recognition among major trading nations that many of the United States’ grievances are in fact legitimate and that China needs to be – in one way or the other – held to account."
Beijing is now realizing that its past trade practices need to be reformed to provide greater reciprocity (market access) and a more level-playing field for trading partners. On the other hand, the West is also beginning to appreciate that some of China's trade practices are perhaps to be emulated rather than censored.
So the trade war may be a timely watershed where both China and the West need to re-examine "the entire terms of engagement between China and the West on trade, investment, and economic integration", as Olsen suggests. As pointed out in my South China Morning Post Op-ed of 24 January, perhaps it is a also a watershed moment for China to practise what it preaches about "building a global community of common destiny", President Trump's "Make America Great Again" unilateralism notwithstanding.
