The above book, due to be released on 15 November, 2012, is by the renowned Edward N. Luttwak, senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and author of many works on strategies ancient and modern.
The following book description is from Amazon.com -
"As the rest of the world worries about what a future might look like under Chinese supremacy, Edward Luttwak worries about China’s own future prospects. Applying the logic of strategy for which he is well known, Luttwak argues that the most populous nation on Earth—and its second largest economy—may be headed for a fall.
For any country whose rising strength cannot go unnoticed, the universal logic of strategy allows only military or economic growth. But China is pursuing both goals simultaneously. Its military buildup and assertive foreign policy have already stirred up resistance among its neighbors, just three of whom—India, Japan, and Vietnam—together outnumber China in population and wealth. Unless China’s leaders check their own ambitions, a host of countries, which are already forming tacit military coalitions, will start to impose economic restrictions as well.
Chinese leaders will find it difficult to choose between pursuing economic prosperity and increasing China’s military strength. Such a change would be hard to explain to public opinion. Moreover, Chinese leaders would have to end their reliance on ancient strategic texts such as Sun Tzu’s Art of War. While these guides might have helped in diplomatic and military conflicts within China itself, their tactics—such as deliberately provoking crises to force negotiations—turned China’s neighbors into foes. To avoid arousing the world’s enmity further, Luttwak advises, Chinese leaders would be wise to pursue a more sustainable course of economic growth combined with increasing military and diplomatic restraint."
With the greatest respect to Edward Luttwak, there are a number of misconeptions about China which may cast doubt on some of his underlying assumptions -
(a) Territorial integrity is a key core interest to China. The South China Sea is of the highest national security as it covers a number of islands and waters under territorial dispute and is a vital channel for energy and trade flows. China's recent flexing of military muscles ensued from a new US military pivot to Asia, which has resulted in more confrontational dynamics in neighbouring countries with territorial claims agaisnt China. It must not be mistaken as manifestation of China's global military ambitions.
(b) China has vastly improved A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) capabilities over the Taiwan Strait but still trails far behind the US in comprehensive military power (30 -50 years) (The Economist, 7 April, 2012, concluding paragraph). This includes technological sophistication, C4ISR, global military outposts and outreach, firepower, rapidity and flexibility of response. Compared with the US 11 aircraft carrier battle groups, China has barely started with an outdated Russian model. In terms of military expenditure, the US still outspends China and the rest of the world combined.
(c) The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) based in London has issued its Military Balance 2012 Report. One notable finding is that China's military capability can be exaggerated as the capability is more "nascent" than actual, notwithstanding a narrwoing gap over the Taiwan Strait.
(d) Starting from a very backward level, China's recent military expansion is commitant with a rising economy and the need to mount more credible defenses of a vast territory, considering the deep scars she still harbours of past subjugation under foreign aggression. Regardless of various perceived hidden items, a great deal of the expenditure goes into improving personnel salaries and conditions.
(e) China has huge domestic problems, including resource and ecological constraints, inequalities, corruption, regional imbalance, asset bubbles, rising middle class aspirations, declining export competitiveness, and an aging population profile in the midst of a leadership transition. Even if China's economy is to exceed that of the U.S. by 2027 as slated, China is set to remain at best a middle-income country like Turkey in per-capita terms well beyond mid-century. Therefore, China simply cannot afford to cherish hegemonic ambitions at the expense of her own economic trajectory, for which a peaceful international environment is crucial.
(f) China has never vowed to achiveve global military supremacy, Nor does she want or hope to, as China has learnt from the folly of the former USSR running a futile arms race which eventually led to its economic collapse.
(g) A number of China's Asian neighbours seem to be rallying around the recent US initiative of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which deliberately excludes China (at least initially). Most of these countries, however, including Japan and Vietnam, have China, which has become the centre of a regional, if not global, supply and production chain, as their largest trading partner and a key driver of their respective economies. It makes no sense for them to antagonise China unecessarily and there is very little mileage to form an anti-China bloc, not even with the United States. For them, however, America's newly-minted Asian piviot comes handy as a free-riding military umbrella to counter-balance China's growing regional influence. That does not translate into a willingness to be at the US's beck and call when push comes to shove.
(h) Sun Tzu's Art of War is still very much revered in China. Indeed, during the recent visit of Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie to the Pentagon, he presented a copy as a gift to Defense Secretary Panetta. But the most important tactic in the Art of War is "Winning without fighting", rather than "deliberately provoking crises to force negotiations". The latter tactic doesn't feature prominently and is more North Korea's Kim Jong-un and his father rather than Sun Tzu.
