What's New

India angry with China's perceived intrusion into Daulat Baig Oldie region of Ladakh

Live interview discussion panel on Times Now of India on 23 April, 2013. Another interview discussion panel was convened the following day.

According to the Financial Times, India's Foreign Minister is visiting China to cool off the tension. Click here

White Paper on China's Armed Forces

On 16 April, China's State Council released a White Paper explaining in some detail the sizes, organization, deployment and missions of the PLA Army (PLAA), the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) (the nation's strategic nuclear and missile deterence force), the People's Armed Police Force (PAPF) and the Militia.

The White Paper seems to respond to concerns with the perceived expansion of China's military expenditure (by 10.7% to $119 billion in 2013). In contrast, because of bugetary constraints, the United States has reduced hers to $640.7 billion for 2013 (a historic low level of only 40% of the entire world's military expenditure, for the first time in many decades) Click here.

The White Paper comes at a time when tensions are rising in the East and South China Seas where China's neighbours with rival territorial claims are becoming emboldened following the United States's strategic pivot to Asia.  Click here

It also comes when U.S. military planners are debating whether the concept of "Air-Sea Battle" (ASB) best serves America's strategic interests in a military confrontation against China. This is aimed at the increasing deterence against war-zone deployment of U.S. carrier assets posed by China's "Anti-Access Area Denail (A2AD)" capabilities. The latter take the form of mobile carrier-killer missiles, nuclear submarines, and long-range strike systems, supported by regional Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) assets.

Some U.S. military planners argue that ASB is predicated upon a first-strike paralysis of China's relevant C2ISR capabilities, which represents the supposedly "last (lowest) rung" of a possible escalation ladder. In such a scenario, according to these planners, "the “burden” of any further potential escalation would thereupon fall upon Beijing, for China presently lacks any capability to execute analogous precision conventional strikes upon the U.S. homeland. It would thus have either simply to accept the loss of its A2/AD capabilities or to take the enormous escalatory step of moving to the use of nuclear weaponry — a step that would presumably result in catastrophe for China in the face of U.S. retaliation".        

The PLA White Paper makes plain the following -

(a) Determined never to seek hegemony, China advances a new security concept of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination in maintaining peace and stability, embracing the strategies of Comprehensive Security, Common Security and Cooperative Security;

(b) The core aims of China's military is to safeguard the nation's sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and peaceful development;

(c) China maintains a high level of military alertness and efficent combat readiness with steadily-elevated integrated reconnaissance and early warning, resistance, counterattack and protection including support and civilian defense systems, strategic deterrence and precision strikes, survival counter-attack, all-dimension response, full-territorial reach, and nuclear and conventional missile capabilities;

(d) The nation is geared to winning local wars under conditions of informatization as well as strategic and comprehensive joint operations;

(e) China safeguards the nation's maritime rights and interests including the deployment of joint military-police-civilian defense mechanisms, and coordination with law enforcement organs of marine surveillance and fisheries administrations;

(f) China needs to become a maritime power to safeguard critical Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCS), China's overseas assets essential for development; as well as the protection and emergency evacuation of Chinese nationals abroad;

(g) Amongst the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, China is the largest contributor of peace-keeping soldiers and police. China is committed to global peace and continues to play an important role in international peace-keeping, disaster and other humanitarian relief, as well as anti-terrroism, anti-piracy and other international joint operations and exercises in maintaining global peace and security.

The message is clear. China is committed to peaceful development and vows never to seek hegemony. However, China is fully prepared for any eventuality including a comprehensive C2ISR readiness and will not tolerate threats to her core interests of sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and continuing development.

This calls into question the validity of the ASB argument. If a first-strike is so effective as to paralyze China's entire C2ISR network, it is doubtful whether in such a perilous situation with unknown or uncertain threats, China would hesitate in deploying long-range missiles, at least conventional ones intially. If, on the other hand, the first-strike impact is less than complete, which is likely in view of the scale and diffusion of C2ISR assets for a country of China's size, the deterence of China's A2AD capabilities is likely to remain.

China's Achilles heel remains her dependence on resource imports through sea lanes. Hence, the country's determination to safeguard SLOCS. These include not only the South China Sea but also the India Ocean and all the way to the source of the bulk of China's energy imports - the Middle East. China's vulnerability is represented by the choke points of the Strait of Hormuz (affected by any international flare-up over Iran) and the Malacca Strait (controlled by the U.S. Seventh Fleet).

China's dominant role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) ensures the security of energy pipelines to China's western borders from and through friendly Central Asian states. Additionally, China is building a Eurasian transportation network encompassing Pakistan (through the port of Gwadar, now trasferred to Chinese management), Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. (Beijing Builds its Eurasian Transportation Network, The Jamestown Foundation, Richard Weitz, 12 April, 2013 here)

In the final analysis, China has now grown to be an 800-pound panda. She can no longer "hide under a bushel and bide her time" as Deng Xiaoping famously cautioned. Her actions and intentions are nevertheless largely defensive, reacting to perceived threats to her core interests of territorial integrity and energy security. even if her rivals and detractors do not see it that way.

The risk is that by constantly baiting and provoking this vast and increasingly more powerful country, things can escalate rapidly to a point of no return. Armageddon is in nobody's interest.

Rather than fixating on military power and zero-sum games, it would be far better to get China involved, in keeping with the turning of the tide, to build a new and sustainable regional and global order in the interest of peace, stability and prosperity for all.

How could talks with North Korea resolve the problem once for all?

During his first official visit to Tokyo as Secretary of State, John Kerry hinted at the possibility of talks with North Korea provided certain strigent conditions are met.

It is timely to list a number of imperatives which are instructive in understanding the North Korea conundrum -

(a) If the North Korea regime collapses, there will be millions of hungry refugees invading China's borders, a humanitarian disaster of perhaps biblical proportions. That's why China keeps on feeding the North Koreans even if China's hand is bitten a number of times;

(b) Both Russia and China don't want a nuclear North Korea as this would trigger the positioning of nuclear weapons by Western allies near Russia and China's borders. What is more, this would spread nuclear armament in the region and beyond, neutralizing their own nuclear strategic advantage. For China, the added fear is a nuclear Japan.

(c) However, North Korea is trying to emulate Chairman Mao who ordered and possessed the Bomb in1964, regardless of everything else. Chairman Mao famously said that China would rather do without trousers (as the country was so poor) than giving up possessing the Bomb. At that time, China was subject to continuous risks of nuclear blackmail from the West and possessing the Bomb was seen as a sure-fired deterrent for preserving national sovereignty and dignity.

(d) For China, North Korea may act as a buffer and a useful bargaining chip against the West . But North Korea regime collapse is not necessarily all bad for China as China, rather than America, will be much more influential in deciding whether a collapsed North Korea is going to be united with South Korea and if so, on what terms (perhaps on condition that America should henceforth withdraw all its forces from a united Korea, which would be a justifiable demand with unification under South Korea). (The China Choice, Hugh White, Black Inc, Australia, 2012, pp. 89-93)

All these explain China's ambivalence in dealing with North Korea.

This also point to the possibility of a long-term negotiated settlement through initial talks behind the scene - North Korea giving up nuclear weapons once for all in a credible, verifiable way in return for an iron-clad guarantee for North Korea's sovereignty and security. This could take the form of a multilateral security treaty including U.S., China, Russia, Japan and South Korea plus abolition of sanctions, joint economic aid and the hope of entry into the World Trade Organization. I mentioned the idea of an iron-clad security guarantee for North Korea in a recent BBC radio program of 29 March, 2013. 

There is no guarantee that the North Koreans would buy that settlement, as the regime is now celebrating 100th birthday of the country's founding father, Kim Il Sung, hailing the country's right to possess nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, nuclear weapons is a means to an end. In "The History of the Peloponnesian War", Thucydides wrote in 431 B.C.E that wars generally originated from fear, honour and profit, the three basic needs of people and nations - security, identity and prosperity.

With North Korea's ever-increasing escalation of dangerous theatrics to secure its ultimate goal of regime stability, national security and development, perhaps the idea of an iron-clad multilateral security treaty guarnatee coupled with powerful tools for economic development may at least be worth a try.