As both Russia and the West are putting more military chips on the table, it seems that not only the future of Ukraine, but security and stability of the entire Eastern Europe if not the whole world hang in the balance.
The reality, however, remains that both sides don’t want and can’t afford an all-out war. Obama’s hands are tied with a war-weary electorate, budget constraints, an economy barely starting to recover, and increasing pressure on America’s Asian commitments. So, apart from using non-military leverage including visa bans and asset freezes, the West is unlikely to open fire.
For Putin, Russia's economy and finances are not at the best of times, with gas prices plummeting and risks of falling European energy demand being lured away by possible America’s exports of excess shale gas. So both sides have openly stated that military options remain the last resort.
Putin’s control over Crimea is a fait accompli. Not only are the miniscule Ukrainian forces there all being rounded up, but the vast majority of the Crimean people are of Russian extraction The Crimea leader asserts that more than 80% of the people there would support joining the Russian Federation. Click here
Likewise, there is a pro-Russian culture in eastern Ukraine increasingly resistant to Kiev interference, although most would still prefer Ukrainian unity. Click here
For both sides, the stakes are high. Click here It is not just Ukraine. For Putin, it is a lynchpin of his dream to restore the past glories of the former USSR through forming a "Eurasian Union" to rival the European Union. For the West, it may spell the beginning of the end of NATO’s credibility. Yet, both sides are likely to stop short of actually pulling the trigger, sabre rattling notwithstanding.
So what seems an attractive leverage for both sides is the public opinion card. For Putin, the largely-predictable outcome of Sunday’s referendum in Crimea is set to boost his bargaining chips. With rising protests on both sides in eastern Ukraine, the option remains open to Putin of suggesting a plebiscite to determine its future. The prospect dangles of eastern Ukraine becoming not exactly like Crimea but perhaps an extraordinarily autonomous region independent of Kiev's diktats, making it remain under Russian economic and political influence. Meanwhile, he is likely to continue to de-legitimize the interim Kiev government.
For the West, while rattling up NATO’s military postures to show muscle, Obama is likely to highlight Putin’s illegal strong-armed occupation of Crimea and his “engineered” Crimean referendum, undermining the legitimacy of Putin’s plot.
An excellent article of 6 March in the Washington Post suggests why Crimean independence or annexation may not be such a good idea for Russia. The arguments are largely centered on three fronts: (a) burden to Russia of having to support Crimea financially; (b) generating fear amongst small countries in the neighborhood likewise with sizable Russian populations; and (c) the chicken may come home to roost on Russian soil in sparely-inhabited eastern Siberian witnessing expanding migrant Chinese settlement from across the border. The risk is that one day, China may turn the table on Russia as sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
On the other hand, as regards (a), if a cash-strapped Kiev can afford to support Crimea financially, so should the Kremlin. As regards (b), certain neighbours' fears are valid but they are unlikely to sever inherent ethnic and economic links to Russia. The risk that they may tilt towards China instead does not seem inevitable, not least because of perceptions that Turkic Uyghurs are not getting a very good deal in China. As regards (c), a resurgent Russia will serve for now to dilute America's capability to contain China in the Asia Pacific. So China is unlikely to stir any trouble in Russia's eastern under-belly, natural expansion of Chinese settlements notwithstanding.
It is unlikely that such a serious strategist as Putin would not have done his sums properly before plotting his moves in Crimea, including the advanced referendum.
An interesting twist is raised in an article of 10 March in The Diplomat, an online platform on international relations, by a researcher with the Tsinghua University School of Public Policy and Management. It advances a case for China’s involvement, perhaps in concert with some other BRICS members or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), helping to broker a deal with Russia to stabilize the situation. This, according to the article, would mean replacing the interim Kiev government with a new one more representative of the aspirations of pro-Russian people, a highly autonomous Crimea, and an eastern Ukraine driven by BRICS-led investment and more independent of Kiev. While the article’s allusion to a future solution for Taiwan is at best comparing apples with oranges, its suggested deal with Russia does not seem altogether impracticable.
Indeed, John J. Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and author of "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics", suggests in the New York Times here that Putin's legitimate security concerns with an enlarging NATO be recognized and that a cooperative deal with Russia is preferable to pushing this vast country into an ant-West camp with China, "the only genuine potential rival to the United States."
Professor Mearsheimer's suggestions chime with an early Op-ed of 6 March by Henry Kissinger in the Washinton Post here . Kissinger proposes a “Finland model” to solve the Ukrainian crisis, comparing the Scandinavian country’s fierce independence while maintaining cordiality with Russia. This consists of (a) letting the Ukrainian people to choose their collective future, including with Europe; (b) not letting Ukraine into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as this would unnecessarily provoke Russia; (c) Ukraine’s freedom to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people, hopefully opting for reconciliation between the various regions and avoiding institutional hostility towards Russia and (d) in exchange for Russia’s recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Crimea’s autonomy is to be reinforced in elections to be held with international observers. The process would include removing any ambiguities about the status of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.
Kissinger’s formula would no doubt help to de-escalate the rising tensions over Ukraine. Whether it could ensure that Crimea remains intact under Ukrainian sovereignty remains to be seen, as Putin seems to have stacked the cards in his favour.
Meanwhile, the world is waiting to see how Putin would move on Crimea’s Sunday referendum. However, it seems unlikely that he is going to back down or reveal his cards in any way before the referendum has taken its course.
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