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China’s Military Strategy 2015

The State Council issued China’s Military Strategy 2015, a White Paper, on 26 May. It gives ample space to clarifying China’s strategic intentions. The Paper makes clear that China continues to vouchsafe never to seek hegemony but will be ready for “counter-attack if attacked”.

It reaffirms China’s strategic goal is to realize a moderately prosperous society by 2021, the centenary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and the China Dream of a “prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally-advanced and harmonious” socialist nation  by 2049, the centenary of the PRC.

On the other hand, the Paper stresses that while a world war is unlikely, a rising China now faces a host of uncertainties including “hegemonism, power politics, and neo-interventionism”, "fermented color-revolutions" as well as “international competition for redistribution of power, rights and interests”, terrorism, hotspot issues, and risks of “small-scale wars”.

These challenges are informed by the United States’ “rebalancing” strategy and Japan’s resurgence, some of China’s neighbours’ “provocative behaviour”, issues over Taiwan, and threats to China’s strategic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs).

China recognizes the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in terms of long-range, precision, smart, stealth, and unmanned weapons, including outer-space and cyber varieties.

China therefore needs to embrace “Active Defence” pushing from land to “Open Sea Protection”.

In this regard, the PLAA (Army) will focus on “trans-theatre mobility” in “multi-dimensional, multi-functional, and sustainable operations”.

The PLAN (Navy) should develop both “offshore water defence” and “open sea” operations as a “modern maritime military force” to safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, including SLOCs.

The PLAAF (Air Force) hould develop into an “Air-Space Defence Force” equipped for “informatized warfare”, “airborne operations”, “strategic projects”, and “comprehensive support”. It will continue to develop early warning,  air strike as well as air and missile defence capabilities. While opposing outer-space weaponization, China will continue to secure “space assets” and seek to maintain “outer-space” security.

The PLASAF (Second Artillery) will be fully prepared to deliver “strategic deterrence”, both nuclear and conventional, including medium and long-range precision strikes, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability. However, China unconditionally pledges never to use nuclear arms first nor enter into a nuclear arms race.

The Paper embodies a variety of military concepts such as “Joint Operations”, “Integrated Systems”, “Civil-Military Integration (CMI)”, and “Preparation for Military Struggle (PMS)” including reconnaissance, command and control, Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE).

The Chinese military is to be equipped with highly-professional personnel, training and “strategic management”, embracing science and technology and productive of forward-looking military theories and strategies. It should also be prepared to undertake Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTWs) as well as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR).

The Paper also emphasizes all-around, pro-active, non-aligned military-to-military and security co-operations with both Russia and the United States as well as many other countries and regions across the globe, including the hosting of military events.

To avoid unwanted military escalation, attention is to be given to “emergency notification, military risk precaution, crisis management, and conflict control”. The object is to deepen mutual understanding, mutual trust and mutual learning in a spirit of “Mutual Respect, Equality, Mutual Benefit, and All-Win Cooperation”. 

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N.B. The most tale-telling focus of the new military strategy is the desire to build the PLAN into a blue-water defensive force, stretching from China's littoral waters to the broad swathe of the South China Sea, across the Indian Ocean to China's maritime Silk Road through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. The latter's inclusion of Djibouti (in the horn of Africa at the entrance of the Red Sea) is instructive.

For background on Djibouti's self-declared role as a rental naval base to the US, France and now China, visit the following expose dated 11 July, 2015 from ChinaSignPost, a strategic consultancy.

Download China SignPost™ (洞察中国) #91: “Djibouti Likely to Become China’s First Indian Ocean Outpost” | Andrew Erickson

 

Water Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan (“Water Ten Directives”)

China's per capita freshwater availability is only a quarter of the world average. Moreover, there is too little water in the north for grains and power generation while the south has suffered from massive floods throughout history. What is more, most of China's water courses, lakes, rivers, and aquifers have now become polluted. So, water security is a serious threat to national security and social stability. 

The long-waited "Water Ten Plan" (Directives) were finally issued by the State Council on 16 April. The outcome of coordination & inputs from more than 12 ministries and government departments, the Action Plan tries to -

"Control pollution discharge, promote economic & industrial transformation and save & recycle resources; Promote science & technology progress, use market mechanisms and enforce law & regulations; Strengthen management & ensure water environment safety; and Clarify responsibilities & encourage public participation". 

In total, there are 238 specific actions involved, probably the most comprehensive water policy to date. Overall objectives & targets are as follows -

"By 2020, China’s water environment quality will gradually improve through the following actions -

(a) To greatly reduce the percentage of badly polluted water bodies – over 70% of water in 7 key rivers shall reach Grade III or above (more here);

(b) To improve the quality of drinking water – over 93% of urban drinking water sources shall reach Grade III or above (more here);

(c) To reduce groundwater over-extraction and control groundwater pollution – groundwater falling under “very bad” category shall decrease to around 15%  (more here)

(d) To improve the environmental quality of coastal areas – up to 70% of coastal water shall reach Grade I or II;

(e) Improve urban water environment in key regions – the amount of Grade V+ water in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei shall fall by 15%, and Grade V+ water shall be eliminated in Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta;

(f) By 2030, the over quality of the ecological environment will be improved; and

(g) By the middle of 21st century, the quality of the ecological environment should be fully improved and the ecosystem should realize a virtuous cycle."

The following key water bodies & areas are being focused - 

• 7 key rivers: Yangtze, Yellow, Pearl, Songhua, Huai, Hai & Liao River;
• 9 key coastal bays;
• 3 key regions: Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta & Pearl River Delta; and
• 36 key cities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, 27 provincial capitals & 5 cities specifically designated in the state plan (including Dalian, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenzhen & Xiamen).

A host of polluting industries are targeted.  

"Moreover, the plan also covers pollution control, water efficiency improvement in agriculture, municipal water use, coastal water management and overall ecological environment protection. Controlling total water use to stay within the Three Red Lines is key".

"To stay within the 2020 cap of 670 billion m3 of water use, the Water Ten Plan uses a mix of water efficiency targets and market mechanisms such as water tariff reform, revised water fees, credit financing and environment performance and eco-compensation".

"The government expects the new plan to boost GDP by around RMB5.7 trillion and to result in RMB1.9 trillion of new investment in the environmental protection related industries (in which RMB1.4 trillion will go to purchasing products & services) and create 3.9 million new non-agriculture jobs".

The above excerpts are taken from a summary of the "Water Ten Plan" in ChinaWater Risks, a global think-thank on China's water risks based in Hong Kong. 

The Four Global Forces Breaking All the Trends

In an April, 2015 Report, McKinsey & Co highlights the following fundamental disruptive global forces that are changing the world "ten times faster, at 300 times the scale, and 3,000 times the impact", compared with the Industrial Revolution.

The following are abbreviated excerpts - 

(a) The first trend is the shifting of the locus of economic activity and dynamism to emerging markets like China and to cities within those markets. Nearly half of global GDP growth between 2010 and 2025 will come from 440 cities in emerging markets—95 percent of them small- and medium-size cities. By 2025, nearly half of the world’s large companies—defined as those with revenue of $1 billion or more—will be headquartered in emerging markets. China will be home to more large companies than either the United States or Europe. For example, the GDP of Tianjin, a dynamic Chinese city, will be around $625 billion—approximately equal to Sweden.

(b) The second disruptive force is the acceleration in the scope, scale, and economic impact of (mobile) technology.China’s mobile text- and voice-messaging service WeChat has 300 million users, more than the entire adult population of the United States. By 2014, mobile applications had hit 1.2 million. Users had downloaded more than 75 billion total apps, more than ten for every person on the planet. Technology allows businesses such as WhatsApp to start and gain scale with stunning speed while using little capital. Entrepreneurs and start-ups now frequently enjoy advantages over large, established businesses. The furious pace of technological adoption and innovation is shortening the life cycle of companies and forcing executives to make decisions and commit resources much more quickly.

(c) The human population is getting older. Fertility is falling, and the world’s population is graying dramatically. While aging has been evident in developed economies for some time, the demographic deficit is now spreading to China and soon will reach Latin America. A smaller workforce will place a greater onus on productivity for driving growth and may cause us to rethink the economy’s potential. Caring for large numbers of elderly people will put severe pressure on government finances.

(d) The final disruptive force is the degree to which the world is much more connected through trade and through movements in capital, people, and information. Instead of a series of lines connecting major trading hubs in Europe and North America, the global trading system has expanded into a complex, intricate, sprawling web. Asia is becoming the world’s largest trading region. “South–south” flows between emerging markets have doubled their share of global trade over the past decade. The volume of trade between China and Africa rose from $9 billion in 2000 to $211 billion in 2012. 

In light of these dramatic shifts, what worked in the past is unlikely to work in the future. Traditional mindsets and intuition will have to be re-educated and re-calibrated if the risks and opportunities of the 21st century are to be fully addressed. 

Download The Four Global Forces Breaking All The Trends

Perhaps China is the only country trying to capture most of these fundamental shifts through enhanced connectivity on a global scale. I am referring to China's latest grand strategy of "One Belt, One Road", recreating a 21st Century Silk Road linking the Middle Kingdom even more closely with the four Continents. That was the subject of my PowerPoint presentation on 28 April at the 2015 Forum Istanbul. Click here

 

Europe's Shattered Dream of Order

There is a great deal of insight in the analysis Europe's Shattered Dream of Order: How Putin Is Disrupting the 
Atlantic Alliance in the May/June 2015 issue of Foreign Affairs by Ivan Krastev, Chair of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, and Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna and Mark Leonard, Co-Founder and Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. 

However, I may enter a caveat on the suggested EU strategy to embrace the Eurasian Economic Union to drive a wedge between Russia and China. 

Russia and China now need each other more than before. Russia's sole dependence on energy exports finds a ready and massive customer, unfettered by Western sanctions. Russian energy offers China alternative transit routes against choke points in the unstable Persian Gulf or the Malacca Strait controlled by the US 7th Fleet. (Similar calculations apply to China's leading role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Central Asia.) 

Above all, both are feeling that the West, especially the United States, is adopting a covert policy of military and economic containment against both of these perceived increasingly-assertive powers, if not discreet political and ideological subversion. So these common geopolitical calculations are bringing the two countries closer together. 

However, Russia and China are not forming themselves into a bloc. Blocs don't often work in an increasingly inter-dependent and interconnected world. Nor are they forming a rigid alliance. 

Indeed, there remains quiet suspicions and rivalry on both sides. The scars of history also run deep in China as much of Russia's Siberian East was seized from the Middle Kingdom during the tail end of her dynastic reigns. Now with more and more Chinese settlements in the Russia Far East, the danger for Russia exists that at some future point, a Crimea-style civil referendum may happen spontaneously near China's Siberian border. 

Listen to my latest radio panel discussion on BBC Newshour and The World Tonight on 24 April. 

As Mark Leonard rightly points out in his FT article, global influence is now more likely to be achieved through geo-economics, rather than the military. 

I should add another important dimension for the 21st Century. That is global connectivity. 

Apart from the internet, infrastructural links are vital, especially high-speed rail, ports, and trade links. This explains China's epic strategy of One Belt, One Road., which is designed to connect China with Asia, the Indian Ocean, East Africa, the Mediterranean, West Europe, Russia, and Central Asia. 

Interestingly, China is also interested in expanding her links with the Eurasian Economic Union, an area rich in resources and a growing middle-class. I alluded to this my recent PowerPoint presentation  at the Forum Istanbul, Turkey on 28 April. 

In light of the above, I don't see how the EU's best option is to attempt to drive a wedge between Russia and China. 

A more effective EU strategy would seem to capitalize on both the Eurasian Economic Union and China's One Belt, One Road strategy by integrating the vast EU market with these initiatives. That way, Russia and China would be drawn more to EU's strengths, in terms of quality standards, regulatory institutions, values, and other norms. 

As alluded by Mark Leonard before, the EU's greatest hope to lead the 21st century is through these soft powers, rather than through any Mearsheimerian "Offensive Realism". 

Turkish-China Relations:New Silk Road in a Changing World

My PowerPoint presentation on 28th April at the 2015 Forum Istanbul, a high-level annual conference with a full-length opening address by the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister the Right Honorable Ali Babacan.

Download 2015 Forum Istanbul PPP (Updated) 

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