The following analysis was first posted on 4 April, 2016. This is re-posted with the latest updates.
A scathing front-page article Beware the cult of Xi in The Economist (2 April, 2016) accuses President Xi of turning himself into another Chairman Mao. It accords Mao with "a mischievous sense of humor" while describing Xi as "reserved and unsmiling". It blames him for almost everything from market gyrations last summer to the recent vaccine scandal. It portrays him as confused in policies and lacking in sense of direction for the economy. It describes him as one obsessed with power concentration - being chairman of everything - and indulges in personality cult. It fears that by ripping apart the Communist Party's "corruption for able-job-done" compact, Xi could well do more harm than good for himself and the Middle Kingdom. Above all, it casts Xi as a super-authoritarian ruler bent on shutting down all civil dissent. In the final analysis, Xi does not seem able to bring about greater wealth and economic well-being and a more open society for the Chinese people.
Whilst Xi is no liberal and lots of vested interests feel threatened, my first reaction is that if Xi is as such bad news as the article describes, we would soon see a collapse in China of the social and economic, if not the political order. Yet, according to findings in September last year by PEW, a world-renowned public opinion survey organisation based in Washington D.C., there is widespread belief that standards of living have improved. Indeed, 96% believe that their lives are better than their parents' generation.
As for personality cult, the affectionate nickname "Xi dada" is not his invention. Compared with his recent predecessors, Xi is winning popularity hands down. In a single party state, fawning behavior is commonplace. But the call to rally behind the Party "core" ("hexin") is not a Xi-era phenomenon. The same happened during the Presidency of Jiang Zemin, and even during the weaker rein of President Hu Jintao. In any case, we are not seeing massive Maoist rallies waving the Little Red Book.
Indeed, any mirage of a Maoist revival is more a reflection of a popular nostalgia for ideals of the early Communist Revolution “where its government was clean, its army was the model of serving the people, its working men and women were dignified, and its life was meaningful without "commodification" and consumerism.” Click here (para.11)
A firm hand at the center has come from the realization that previous lax attitude towards provinces has resulted in uncontrolled, widespread corruption, power grabs and blocs of rent-seekers. With the Bo Xilai Affair, it dawned on the top leadership that unless the Party firmly grasps the nettle, its whole legitimacy and survival would be at risk.
The Economist leading article concedes that Xi's anti-corruption campaign has been popular with the Chinese people. What it fails to see is that as corruption has become so deep-seated and far-reaching, the whole legitimacy of the Party is under existential threat without a major surgery. To get on top of powerful opposing vested interests, authority needs to be concentrated as corruption has spread into every corner, including the military. The recent fall from grace of top Party and military brasses is a case in point.
A firm hand is also needed as, through turbulent waters, Xi is shifting China's complex behemoth into a different development model, more oriented towards consumer, innovation, and sustainable development. The unveiling of the country's ambitious Five Year Plan doesn't depict confused policies or a leader lacking in sense of direction.
However, centralized coordination doesn't translate into micro-management. The Five Year Plan, for example, comes from months if not years of input from groups of home-grown and foreign experts across the board, where the input and guidance of Premier Li Keqiang are evident. With its vast size and diversity, 21st-century China is no 16th-century Spain. The comparison with Philip II is a little ludicrous.
All in all, The Economist article under-estimates the complexity in China's change of direction and the need for a firm hand to turn things around, increased authoritarianism notwithstanding. It also conflates China's learning curve in financial reform with sheer incompetence and confused policies.
This happens to tally with the take of Cheng Li, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution - The end of collective leadership in China? Not really - what he makes of the latest communique of the Communist Party of China (CCP) issued at the conclusion of the Sixth Plenum on 27 October, 2016. This sets the tone for the 19th Party Congress in the latter half of 2017. Cheng is the author of a new book, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership.
To understand China's complexities and to see if and how China is likely to achieve her Five Year goals, click here.
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